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After 25 years, the global vision for human security as a concept and a policy 
commitment remains unfulfilled in most parts of the world. In fact, more and more 
evidence points to the growing reality that the idea of securing people has once 
again succumbed to the traditional concepts of state security and regime security, 
as it did after World War II. Part of the problem can be found in some major policy 
instruments adopted by proponents of human security. Military intervention for 
human protection, economic sanctions and judicial punishment or threats thereof, 
which have been regarded as policy instruments to protect people or promote 
human security, have proved to be either insufficient or ineffective, and at worst 
counter-productive.
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Introduction
This special issue provides an assessment of human security as a concept, now 25 
years in the making. The big question for us is whether there is enough evidence 
to show that the security of individual human beings has been sufficiently 
promoted and actually enhanced on a global scale. Although there is a general 
agreement that human security differs from other concepts of security, given 
that people serve as the referent object of human security, people in various 
parts of the world, especially those in the non-Western regions, are far from 
secure. In spite of the early euphoria about the promise of human security, recent 
developments have proved to be far from positive. The 1990s was one of the 
most optimistic or hopeful decades in world history. The last decade of the 20th 
century seemed primed to bring change and hope back to the world, which had 
endured the breakout and destruction of World War I (1914-1918), the Great 
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Depression (the 1930s), World War II (1939-1945), and the Cold War (1947-1991). 
In comparison, the end of the Cold War gave rise to a new sense of optimism 
about the future of the world and humanity. In 1989, the United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly declared The 1990s is as the decade of international law. Thus, 
in contrast the 1990s is also known as the “sanctions decade,” as the number of 
economic sanctions imposed on states or regimes that violated international law 
increased (Cortright and Lepez 2002, 2000).
The 1990s also witnessed a shift in emphasis in international law from 
state sovereignty and national security to the rights and security of individuals. 
Although the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of 
Human Right in 1948, human rights was not well protected and promoted 
throughout the Cold War because of power politics. Mass atrocities were 
committed by state authorities in the name of national security or ideology, such 
as those that took place in so-called socialist or communist countries (Courtois et 
al. 1999). It was not until after the end of the Cold War that much more attention 
was paid to gross human rights violations such as those that took place in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda during the first half of the 1990s. In the midst of 
such developments, the idea of human security emerged.
Much has been written about human security (Hanlon and Christie 2016; 
Peou 2014a; MacFarland and Khong 2006), but more work is needed to assess the 
impact of this concept on human life. After 25 years, the global vision for human 
security as a concept and a global policy commitment remains unfulfilled in many 
parts of the world. In fact, more and more evidence points to the growing reality 
that the idea of securing people has once again succumbed to the traditional 
concepts of state security and regime security, as it did after World War II. Part of 
the problem can be found in some policy instruments adopted by proponents of 
human security. Military intervention for human protection, economic sanctions 
and judicial punishment or threats thereof, which were regarded as policy 
instruments to protect people or promote human security, have proved to be 
either insufficient or ineffective and at worst counter-productive.
Human Security: In the Beginning
It may be useful to clarify that human rights and human security are not quite 
the same, although some of their conceptual aspects overlap. Human rights 
are concerned with the way in which governments treat their peoples who are 
assumed to enjoy universal rights such as civil and political rights as well as 
economic, social and cultural rights. Human security is more about human 
survival or more broadly freedom from threat to human wellbeing. In the study 
of human security, proponents seek to answer the following questions: What are 
human beings secured against? Who provides for this type of security? How (what 
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are the policy instruments)?
The concept of human security was first formalized by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) in its Human Development Report published 
in 1994. The UNDP’s concept of security posed a direct challenge to the 
traditional concepts of security, most notably national security, international 
security, common security, comprehensive security, and comprehensive security 
(Peou 2014a). Unlike these other concepts that are state-centric, human security 
is about the security of individual human beings. In other words, individual 
human beings, not states, are the main referent object of security. According to 
UNDP, “human security is people-centred” (UNDP 1994, 23; italics added). It is 
also worth noting that proponents of human security do not say that all humans 
are equally insecure, as some more secure than others. They pay most of their 
attention to civilian populations vulnerable to direct and indirect violence.
The UNDP approach implicitly answers the above questions. Characterized 
as “broad” or “comprehensive,” the UNDP defines security as “freedom” in 
two dimensions:  “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” (ibid.). The 
list of threats to these two types of freedom includes the following: economic 
security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, 
community security, and political security. It is worth noting that the idea of 
securing people through these two freedoms can be traced back to 1941 when 
U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) delivered a major speech that laid out 
four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and 
freedom from fear (Engel 2016). The UNDP idea, however, has led its proponents 
in two different but arguably mutually reinforcing paths: “development-based” 
and “protection-based” (MacFarland and Khong 2006). The development-based 
path gives priority to freedom from want, centered on the idea of prevention 
rather than intervention, bottom-up rather than top-down, placing emphasis 
on social-economic or human development rather than coercive international 
intervention. The protection-based approach is more about securing vulnerable 
civilian populations, through coercive intervention against sources of physical 
violence, such as armed conflicts and mass atrocities (war crimes, genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity).
According to the UNDP, freedom from fear means freedom from direct 
physical violence, which includes a number of threats to community security and 
personal security: sectarian and ethnic violence, threats from the state (physical 
torture), threats from other states (war), threats from other group of people 
(ethnic tension), threats from individuals or gangs against other individuals 
or gangs (crime and street violence), and threats directed at children based on 
their vulnerability and dependence (child abuse). Proponents of freedom from 
fear paid attention to these sources of human insecurity resulting from the 
tragic events after the end of the Cold War, such as intra-state armed conflicts 
and mass atrocities which took place in countries like the former Yugoslavia 
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and Rwanda, where unarmed civilian populations based on their religious and 
ethnic backgrounds were subjected to what came to be known as war crimes, 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Policy instruments 
designed to deal with threats to freedom from fear include military intervention, 
economic sanctions, and judicial deterrence/punishment or its threat. The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s military intervention in the Libya in 2011 is the 
first and best example of international efforts to protect people within the context 
of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), at a time when the leadership of Libya was 
accused of committing crimes against its own people or, additionally, suspected 
to have been prepared for more violence against them (Daalder and Stavridis 
2012; Bellamy 2011). Smart sanctions have also been advocated and adopted to 
protect people (Cortright and Lepez 2002). Another type of global action taken 
to address mass atrocities was the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda. Subsequently other international criminal tribunals and courts were 
established, and among them was the International Criminal Court.
Freedom from want is much broader than freedom from fear and is generally 
defined as freedom from indirect or structural violence against individual human 
beings. Freedom from want is not the same as human development, which means 
enlarging people’s choices and freedoms. However, freedom from want means 
freedom from socio-economic and environmental threats that limit people’s 
choices and freedoms. Specific indicators include poverty, hunger, diseases and 
unhealthy lifestyles, socio-economic inequalities, and unsustainable development 
because of growing world population and environmental destruction. Proponents 
of human security have paid attention the threat of environmental degradation 
to future human survival and well-being (Mohajan 2015). They adopted the 
idea of “sustainable development,” formulated by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (1987, 8) making the case that development 
is “sustainable” when it “meets the [human] needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Global 
climate change and the loss of biodiversity have given rise to the politics of 
scarcity. There is, thus, a need to preserve our global commons and ensure 
environmental security if our welfare and security are to be maintained and a 
sense of urgency to motivate different actors to take collective action that would 
reverse environmental threats (Brainard et al. 2009). In September 2015, 193 
UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with 
seventeen goals to ensure world peace and prosperity for both people and the 
planet.
In short, the idea of human security has its historical root that can be traced 
back to at least in the early 1940s when World War II was raging and it was not 
until after the end of the Cold War that it received renewed attention. The year 
1994 marked the beginning of a UN push for the idea of securing human beings 
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in addition to the protection of their individual rights.
A Critical Reflection on Human Security after 25 Years
Whether individual human beings have become more secure in the last twenty-
five years is a matter of debate and further research. But what is clear is that 
the idea of human security has been confronted with several major challenges: 
empirical, conceptual, theoretical, and methodological. 
Empirically, global trends since the end of the first decade of the 21st century 
appear mixed and full of uncertainty. On the one hand, proponents of human 
security have observed some positive developments. In the Asia-Pacific, for 
instance, they highlight what major countries like Australia, Japan and South 
Korea have done to improve human security. Australia is said to have coordinated 
with Japan, Indonesia and the Pacific Islands Forum on this front. Through 
such efforts, Japan has engaged in peacebuilding in fragile states. Some Japanese 
writers characterize the Japanese approach to human security on the basis of the 
“Tokyo Consensus” (Hoshino and Satoh 2016). Even sovereign-centric states 
like China appear to be moving slowly in this direction, despite the fact that the 
term of human security has yet to appear on the government’s policy agenda and 
despite China’s “people-first” doctrine and its “new approach to human security” 
(Xiao and Yanxing 2016; Jiadong and  Xin 2016).
On the other hand, much of what has been positively observed tends to 
highlight freedom from want in terms of policy commitment to such issues as 
health care, energy security, and environmental protection. At the same time, 
governments in various regions of the world remain overwhelmingly committed 
to the concept of national security or regime security. In spite of the vast amount 
of talking and writing about human security, efforts at realizing it are far from 
ideal. In the words of a proponent of human security, “despite the commissions, 
resolutions, reports, declarations and a multimillion-dollar Trust Fund, and 
despite the consensus of like-minded countries on the protection of people, 
human security is far from having been achieved, or even adopted as a global 
– let alone national – goal” (Tadjbakhsh 2014, 2). In her assessment, “the term 
‘human security’ still courts rejection twenty years after its inception” (ibid.).
Even some democratic countries like Canada and Norway that used to 
embrace human security no longer explicitly embrace the concept (Peou 2009). 
After coming to power in 2006, the conservative government shelved the concept 
and slashed the funding. The country “dropped out of sight internationally as a 
promoter of the concept” (Small 2016, 1). The liberal government, formed after 
the 2015 election, did better in terms of its commitment to human rights, but the 
Canadian contribution to peacekeeping diminished substantially: only sixty-eight 
troops in 2017 and 112 in 2016. During the Cold War and into the 1990s, Canada 
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was one of the world’s top contributors to UN peacekeeping operations (with over 
3,000 troops). 
Even countries that keep human security on their policy agendas still largely 
adhere to national security. In the Asia-Pacific, where countries are known for 
their economic ‘miracles,’ states remain Westphalian in policy orientation as 
they remain wedded to state sovereignty and security, still “preoccupied with 
protecting autonomy and independence, retaining a gatekeeping role, and 
avoiding external interference in domestic and constitutional arrangements” 
(Sperling 2007, 282). The state is still the referent object of security and the 
“securitizing agent” (Tow 2016). Although democratic states within the European 
Union (EU) are treated as post-Westphalian, those in the Asia-Pacific have yet 
to move in this direction. National security, for instance, continues to shape 
Australia’s foreign policy agenda (Walton and Akimoto 2016).
Moreover, the terror attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 
initiated a backward moving trend in world politics: the global war on terrorism 
and a renewed emphasis on national security. The US invasions of Afghanistan 
on October 7, 2001 and Iraq on March 19, 2003 were driven by the United 
States’ policy to reassert its hegemonic positon in world politics (Butt 2019) and 
produced deadly consequences, such as the global spread of terrorism, the rise of 
ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and an internationalized civil war in Syria. 
Geopolitics appears to be making a comeback (Mead 2014), as evidenced by 
territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, the Russian annexation of 
Crimea, and tensions between Iran and the United States. The ongoing trade ‘war’ 
between China and the United escalated and is likely to cause collateral damage 
in the Asia-Pacific. Washington’s policy actions in the Middle East added more 
fuel to the fire when the Trump administration chose to confront Iran on nuclear 
issues, decided to dispatch 1,500 additional troops and more warships to the 
region, and sought to expedite arms sales to its allies in the Middle East, namely 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan.
Since the turn of the 21st century, the world has become increasingly armed. 
Total global military spending in 2018, for instance, rose to US$ 1,822 billion. 
China (with US$ 250 billion) and the United States (with US$ 649 billion) alone 
represent half of the amount (SIPRI 2019a). Global arms sales, similarly, are still 
moving in a upward trend. In 2017, arms sales and military services by the world’s 
top 100 arms-producing and military services companies reached US$ 398.2 
billion, representing an increase of 44 percent since 2002. The companies based 
in the United States (with US$ 226.6 billion) accounted for 57 percent of the 
amount, followed by those based in Russia (with US$ 37.7 billion) (SIPRI 2018). 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “The volume 
of international transfers of major arms in 2014–18 was 7.8 per cent higher than 
in 2009–13 and 23 per cent higher than in 2004–2008” (SIPRI 2019a). In Asia and 
Oceania, to where 40 percent of global arms sales went from 2014 to 2018, the 
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five top importers were India, Australia, China, South Korea, and Vietnam. The 
second largest importer region was the Middle East, which received 40 percent of 
global arms imports in the same period (SIPRI 2019b).
All this should come as no surprise to anyone, when considering the fact that 
overall global peace continues to deteriorate. According to Global Peace Index 
designed to measure global peacefulness, for instance, “the global level of peace 
has deteriorated by 0.27 per cent in the last year, marking the fourth successive 
year of deteriorations. Ninety-two countries deteriorated, while 71 countries 
improved” (Institute for Economics & Peace 2018, 2). The Index further “reveals 
a world in which the tensions, conflicts, and crises that emerged in the past 
decade remain unresolved, especially in the Middle East, resulting in this gradual, 
sustained fall in peacefulness” (ibid., 2). Although Europe, North America, Asia-
Pacific, and South America are the four most peaceful regions in the world, they 
“all recorded deteriorations, with the largest overall deterioration occurring in 
South America, owing to falls in the Safety and Security domain, mainly due to 
increases in the incarceration rate and impact of terrorism” (ibid.), as well as other 
forms of violence such as transnational organized crimes and armed insurgencies. 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) “remains the world’s least peaceful 
region, a position it has held since 2015” (ibid.). Syria, Afghanistan, South 
Sudan, Iraq and Somalia were among the least peaceful countries. The long and 
bitter conflict between Israelis and Palestinians remains unresolved. What these 
findings suggest is that countries that enjoyed the highest level of peacefulness are 
those that are politically democratic and economically advanced. Thus, political 
democracy and economic development are necessary if not sufficient conditions 
for peacefulness - and also for human security. 
Armed conflicts and political violence around the world, especially in the 
Middle East and North Africa, have also produced a large number of refugees, 
who are among the world’s most vulnerable and insecure groups. More than 70 
million people had been forced out of their home by 2018 and nearly 30 million 
of them were refugees. According to a UN report, “the world is witnessing the 
highest levels of displacement on record” (UN n.d.-a).
A report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) further shows 
that homicidal violence in 2017 killed far more people worldwide (464,000) 
than armed conflict (89,000) and terrorist violence (26,000) in the same year, 
representing an increase from 362,000 in 1990. According to the report, “Between 
2015 and 2017 the total number of homicide victims worldwide increased by 4 
per cent, or around 19,000 victims” (UNODC 2019, 12). “If this trend continues,” 
says the report, “target 16.1 (‘significantly reduce all forms of violence and related 
death rates everywhere’) under Sustainable Development Goal 16…set in 2015, 
will not be met by 2030” (ibid., 12).
When broadly defined, human security as a global policy agenda also 
remains far from realized. While the overall human development index shows 
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a general improvement, global political violence and poverty remains a threat 
to people. Although “[p]overty rates in the developing world have decreased 
dramatically over the past decades,” according to one study, “several countries 
covered by this study are at serious risk of democratic backsliding, while 
globally, democratic standards are equally deteriorating” (Wietzke 2019, 952). 
According to the UN, moreover, more than 700 million people still live under the 
international poverty line of US$ 1.90 a day and most of them belong to Southern 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. High poverty rates are evident in conflict-affected 
countries (UNDP 2016). By 2018, many of the 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals remain unfulfilled. In the Asia-Pacific, where economic growth has been 
impressive over the last several decades, states are not on track to achieving any 
of the goals in 2030. According to a UN report (ESCAP 2019), progress in some 
areas (such as ending poverty, access to quality education, as well as affordable 
and clean energy) remains limited; however, trends in other areas have been 
negative. Clean water and sanitation, economic growth and decent work, as well 
as responsible consumption and production show negative trends.
Some Critical Challenges to Human Security
The question is: Why is it that the idea of human security appears to have made 
no significant impact? There may be many reasons, some of which can be 
identified. Firstly and conceptually, there is no global consensus on what human 
security means and this makes it difficult for the global policy community to 
take collective action to address threats to human security. Critics have pointed 
to the lack of conceptual clarity. Roland Paris (2001) was among the first critics 
to make the case against the concept by questioning its usefulness because it 
lacks a precise definition and because its proponents prefer to keep the concept 
expansive and vague. The underlying ideas of human security are something that 
most people can talk about, but one of the main challenges is the extent to which 
it can be operationalized. One of the questions is: If the definition of human 
security covers almost everything, what is not human security? The discussion 
around human security has certainly opened a Pandora’s Box, meaning different 
things to different people. Some advocate a “bottom-up” approach (Hanlon 
and Christie 2016). Others adopt a “top-down” approach in favor of military 
intervention, economic sanctions, and judicial deterrence (Peou 2014b).
This concept has become amorphous to the point where any collective 
action required for ensuring the security of individual human beings has become 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. Some proponents of human security do not 
subscribe to the UNDP approach. They do not necessarily reject the “freedom-
from-want” dimension of the concept but tend to pay more attention to the other 
dimension: freedom from fear. They consider this dimension to be in need of 
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serious attention. The Canadian government under the liberal leadership of Prime 
Minister Jean Chretien and his foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy (2001), took on 
the challenge of narrowing down the concept of human security by sponsoring 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which 
published The Responsibility to Protect known as R2P (ICISS 2001). This new 
norm became a globally acknowledged standard when the UN General Assembly 
endorsed it in what is now known as the 2005 World Outcome Document and 
the UN Security Council in 2006 passed Resolution 1674 to reaffirm it. The 
R2P norm is based on three pillars. The first pillar rests on the idea that states 
have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from war crimes, 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The second pillar states 
that the international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help 
states to exercise this responsibility. The third pillar stresses the importance of the 
international community to use peaceful and other means necessary to protect 
civilian populations against mass atrocities if states themselves fail to do so.
Secondly and theoretically, proponents of human security have engaged 
in making normative arguments, one of which is that states alone cannot 
address global challenges such as human rights violations and that international 
organizations (intergovernmental organizations, international non-profit 
organizations, and multilateral organizations) should play a greater role. Evidence 
appears to challenge this normative thinking. Barry Buzan (2001, 589) still makes 
a compelling argument by remarking that states remain “a necessary condition 
for individual security because without the state it is not clear what other agency 
is to act on behalf of individuals.” As noted earlier, states in Europe and North 
America are more able than states in other regions when it comes to the question 
of who is best at providing for human security. What states in these two regions 
have in common are their democratic values and economic development, as 
well as economic interdependence. But it is far from clear that international 
organizations such as the EU are more effective than states since there are no 
comparable regional institutions in North America. With the United Kingdom 
in the process of leaving the EU, anti-EU populism, illiberal nationalism and the 
inability of EU members to speak with one voice on major foreign and defense 
policy issues, regional integration in Europe is beginning to unravel (Walt 2019; 
Gramer 2019).
While the state remains the best, if insufficient, actor in ensuring human 
security, national governments have yet to place the security of individuals 
beyond their national borders as a top priority on their policy agendas. When 
they tried to prioritize human security, they either had ulterior motives or failed. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR)’s freedom from want and freedom from fear, for 
instance, were part of a major speech delivered during World War II, but his 
strategy was aimed at building national consensus in preparation for the United 
States entering World War II. These two freedoms soon faced a number of critical 
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challenges, including the post-World War II rise of American capitalism, the Cold 
War, the economic crises in the 1970s, and the emergence of neo-liberalism in 
the 1980s hostile to FDR’s government-based approach to dealing with political, 
social, and economic problems (Jones 2016; Costigliola 2016). 
More can be said about human security after the UNDP adopted the 
concept. The persistence of national security and the resurgence of geopolitics 
appear to have weakened efforts at human security promotion. Material resources 
directed toward national or regime security far exceed those allocated for human 
security. Political realism, whose theoretical merits were called into question after 
the end of the Cold War, seems to be making a comeback (Walt 2018; Mead 2014; 
Kaplan 2014; Mearsheimer 2006). Global terrorism, the resurgence of geopolitics 
(such as competitive territorial claims) and the rise of China are among the 
recent developments that have precipitated the comeback of realism with its 
emphasis on national security. The rise of China, with a growing dictatorship 
under President Xi Jinping who claims to be committed to the SDG agenda, has 
not only engaged in a trade war with the United States but continues to spend 
much on defense and protects political regimes that are undemocratic, corrupt, 
and abusive. Beijing has sought to build a “world-class military” by 2049 (Fravel 
2019). China’s development assistance has also been accused of working to 
promote its own national interests, establish security alliances, and undermine 
efforts by Western democracies to promote democracy, human rights, and good 
governance (Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Naim 2007; Tull 2006). As the rise of China 
continues, Japan has also witnessed transformation from a state characterized by 
commercial pacifism to one that shows an inclination toward realism (Hughes 
2016; Green 2001). Japan has built its first aircraft carriers and currently plans 
to buy more advanced military aircraft (42 F-35s and 105 F-35As) over the next 
10 years. Japan, whose military alliance with the United States has survived the 
Cold War, is revaluating its dependence on the latter’s security guarantees as it is 
confronted with the possibility that the country might need to prepare for war 
(Smith 2019).
Thirdly, the idea of human security appears to suffer from the implementa- 
tion of certain policy measures that are proven to be insufficient, ineffective, and 
even counterproductive. It is interesting to note that Franklin Roosevelt’s idea of 
freedoms did not pave the way for the development of human security after World 
War II and may have contributed to the strengthening of national security, the 
emergence of the Cold War, global terrorism and the war on terrorists around the 
world, and possibly the post-Cold War resurgence of geopolitics. The American 
president’s idea of freedom was evidently designed to prepare the Americans 
for a collective war against the Axis Powers and, in turn, these ideas did survive 
his presidency; however, the fear of holocaust, the fear of communism and the 
enlargement of national security were instead justified in American foreign 
policy. The four freedoms were pursued “everywhere in the world” (Hitchcock 
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2016) and may have produced unintended consequences. The U.S. policy ended 
up reinforcing and reiterating American exceptionalism, as well as stimulating 
American imperialism that sparked “hatred intense enough to motivate terrorist 
attacks on the United States” (Costigliola 2016, 186). The UNDP idea of human 
security is opposed to imperialism in that individual human beings or humanity 
are the referent object of security and requires collective action among different 
actors that include international institutions, but some policy tools used to 
protect people and promote their security are either ineffective or may have 
produced undesirable consequences.
The Limits (and Dangers) of Policy Instruments for Human Security
Specific attention has been given to the promotion of human security through the 
establishment of various mechanisms and policy instruments, but it is far from 
clear how effective they have been. The Commission on Human Security, Human 
Security Network, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 
the Friends of Human Security, and the UN Trust Fund for Human Security all 
have stood out as collective efforts to promote human security worldwide, but 
the extent to which they have made a difference remains unknown. Very little is 
known about the resources they have had at their disposal. Proponents of human 
security have advocated or adopted a number of policy instruments designed 
to enhance freedom from fear and freedom from want, including military 
intervention (peacekeeping and peace enforcement), peace building, smart 
economic sanctions, and international criminal justice through the establishment 
of international criminal tribunals and courts (Peou 2014b). 
Peace operations—peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building—
do not have an impressive record. Global efforts at global peacekeeping and 
peace building remain woefully limited (ibid.). Currently the UN Department of 
Peace Operations leads fourteen peacekeeping missions around the world, most 
of which are in Africa. As noted, global military spending has increased and far 
exceeds spending on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The UN budget approved 
for the fourteen peacekeeping operations deployed around the world, most of 
which were in Africa (from July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019) was only US$ 6.69 
billion miniscule in comparison (UN 2019). Between 2006 and 2017, the UN 
Peacebuilding Fund, which was designed to prevent a relapse into violent conflict, 
allocated only US$ 772 million to forty-one countries (UN n.d.-b).
Peace enforcement or military intervention for human protection has been 
a controversial topic. For proponents of human security who embrace the norm 
of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), this form of intervention is necessary when 
civilian populations are being massacred or come under the threat of mass 
murder by their own governments. For instance, they view NATO’s military 
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attacks on Libya in 2011 as the first instance of R2P in action. According to 
Alex Bellamy (2011, 263), this was “the first time that the Security Council has 
authorized the use of military force for human protection purposes against 
the wishes of a functioning state.” The UN mandate was clear: “there was the 
extraordinary clarity of the threat of mass atrocities. Not since Rwanda has 
a regime so clearly signaled its intent to commit crimes against humanity. 
With direct echoes of Rwanda, Qaddafi told the world that “officers have been 
deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can purify all decisions from 
these cockroaches,” and that “any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be 
executed’” (ibid., 265).
The NATO intervention in Libya was controversial, has been harmful 
to many people in this country and globally divisive. According to some 
observers, the mission in Libya was successfully accomplished. The international 
community was able to take collective action. NATO’s Partnership for Peace acted 
in a legitimate fashion because of international support as well as support from 18 
coalition members (including Arab states, such as Jordan, Morocco, and United 
Arab Emirates). The Gaddafi regime was defeated. The lives of many civilians 
were saved. Elections in Libya were held in July 2012 (Daalder and Stavridis 
2012). The Arab Spring was in full swing. But it has now become clear that the 
intervention has yet to make the people of Libya more secure. Bellamy (2011) 
writes “the form of intervention in Libya was highly imperfect, that it delivered 
indirect and patchy protection at best, and that it placed the region’s long-term 
stability in the hands of fractious rebels about whom little is known” (269; italics 
added). Developments since 2011 have been detrimental to human security. 
According to Mark Curtis (2019), “the West’s war in Libya spurred terrorism into 
14 countries.” Alan Kuperman (2015) regards the military action as an “abject 
failure.” Not only has the country “failed to evolve into a democracy,” but it also 
“has devolved into a failed state” (ibid., 67). According to a report by Amnesty 
International (2019, 1), “Militias, armed groups and security forces continued 
to commit with impunity crimes under international law and gross human 
rights violations and abuses, including war crimes, throughout the year. Clashes 
between competing militias resulted in an increased number of civilian casualties. 
Thousands of people were held indefinitely without any judicial process following 
arbitrary arrest, including many detained since 2011.” Reports by Human Rights 
Watch (2018) also paint a grim picture of post-2011 Libya. No collective action 
has been taken in the name of R2P to put an end to the civil war that broke out in 
2014 and to human suffering in Syria (Nasser-Eddine 2012), a country that has 
become a major battleground for geopolitical competition between major powers, 
most notably Russia and the United States. NATO’s intervention in Libya angered 
Russia, but its failure has also emboldened the latter to play a more active role in 
the Middle East and Northern Africa (O’Conner 2017).
Economic sanctions as a policy instrument have been adopted by the UN 
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and its members, such as the EU and the United States, to change state behavior 
or stop human rights violations, and to counter terrorism committed by non-
state actors, but it remains a controversial measure. As pointed by one writer, 
“a targeted sanctions regime is now the preferred Security Council sanctions 
instrument. Indeed, all of the recent sanctions measures imposed by the 
Security Council have been targeted” (Stephanides 2002, ix). Since the mid-
1990s, this policy tool has been refined and implemented to avoid collateral 
damage (Cortright and Lepez 2002). It is assumed that this policy tool has 
been effective not only in minimizing pain for vulnerable civilian populations 
in target countries but also in improving human rights in non-target countries 
(Carneiro 2014). Some findings, however, suggest that civilian populations in 
target countries suffer, but those in non-target countries benefit from sanctions. 
As one scholar puts it, “sanction activity may yield increases in respect for human 
rights at the global level, but that increase likely comes at the expense of those 
that live in states where human rights sanctions are imposed” (Clay 2018, 134). 
This argument remains far from conclusive, as the global human rights situation 
has deteriorated over the last 13 years. Some scholars even predict the end-times 
of human rights (Hopgood 2014). Others point to the worldwide retreat of liberal 
democracy (Freedom House 2019; The Economist 2018). 
The “sanctions decade” has not given rise to a global system in which the 
concept of human security prevails upon those of national and regime security. 
In fact, sanctions have exacerbated geopolitical competition to the detriment 
of human security. The recent U.S. sanctions on Iran imposed by the Trump 
administration, for instance, have not only harmed the Iranian economy but also 
“empowered anti-US forces within Iranian politics, and armed conflict with the 
US remains a possible outcome” (IISS 2019). The sanctions imposed on Syria 
have resulted in human suffering, despite the fact that its government has been 
the target. Nour Samaha (2019) is correct in making the conclusion that “sanctions 
can never be ‘smart’.” Instead of weakening the repressive regime in Syria, the U.S. 
and E.U. sanctions have strengthened it. In her view, the West “needs to be far 
more honest about the counter-productiveness of a tool, and particularly sectoral 
sanctions, which will produce little in its stated intentions and instead have a 
detrimental impact on the wider population” (ibid.).
The pursuit of international criminal justice also does not appear to become 
more effective than the use of military force and economic sanctions, despite 
the optimistic assumption that international criminal tribunals and courts 
would be able to help end armed conflicts and mass atrocities or deter them. 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 does not 
seem to have produced any significant effects on the actions of political regimes 
that violate human rights or threaten the security of their own people. The ICC 
and other criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court for the 
former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the 
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Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia have yet to make many parts 
of the world safer for civilian populations. Cambodia has moved away from a 
nascent democracy back toward a one-party state (Peou 2019). Many countries 
in East Asia, are still under authoritarian or military rule. Ethnic violence is 
still pervasive in Myanmar, where ethnic cleansing has been committed by the 
military-dominated regime against Rohingya civilians. Armed conflicts and 
human rights violations continue unabated in the Middle East. According to one 
scholar, “neither the ICC nor R2P can confront the underlying causes of many 
conflicts: to do that requires a commitment to radical change in international 
economics, not international politics or international law” (Ainley 2015, 53).
The “decade of international law” has yet to effectively weaken the realist idea 
of state security, but Kirsten Ainley’s (2015) point further raises the question of 
whether economic growth and radical change alone would produce better results 
in the enhancement of human security. Economic growth in Africa appears to be 
insufficient in ensuring the security of people on the continent because of poor 
national governance. As previously noted, Africa is still among the least peaceful 
regions. Although states in East Asia have enjoyed impressive economic growth, 
many of their people remain insecure. States that are economically developed or 
developing (such as Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam) 
tend to increase defense spending or maintain high defense expenditures. Most 
noteworthy is the fact that Japan, one of the world’s most developed countries, 
used its newfound wealth to complete its rearmament in the late 1980s by turning 
its Self-Defense Forces into a modern, technologically advanced force (Smith 
2019). World history still leaves us wondering if a non-capitalist international 
system would bring about peace and security, as wars broke out before the 
emergence of world capitalism and were fought between socialist states (China 
and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, Cambodia and Vietnam in the late 1970s, 
and China and Vietnam in 1979) during the Cold War.
All in all, the global use of military, economic and judicial threat to change 
bad political behavior since the 1990s has not given rise to an international system 
based on the idea of human security. From Cambodia to Indonesia and East 
Timor and from Myanmar to North Korea, the threat of punishment directed 
at ruling elites tend to be ineffective or detrimental to the security of civilian 
populations (David and Holliday 2006; Peou 2016, 2014a). Instead of giving up 
power, authoritarian leaders tend to hunker down when they come under threat 
and hold on to power even if it means causing human suffering. According to 
their work on Myanmar, for instance, Roman David and Ian Holliday (2012, 136) 
argue that, “our experts defied much activist opinion in holding that revoking 
both policies had the best chance of promoting thoroughgoing reform inside the 
country.” Their experts advocated a combination of policy actions: the lifting of 
sanctions and guarantees of non-prosecution. Thus, proponents of sanctions, 
judicial punishment or its threat and military humanitarian intervention may 
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need to reflect more critically on the fact these policy tools may have been 
historically ineffective and may contribute to human insecurity.
Conclusion and Additional Points for Consideration
Overall, the first decade of the 21st century saw the beginning of a general 
decline of policy interest in the promotion of human security and the future of 
humanity is far from certain since states are far from obsolete and international 
organizations as well as non-state actors have yet to become the primary agents 
of change. This was the main reason we invited a number of scholars to reflect on 
the challenges that still confront the promise of human security. The next four 
articles cover human security in East Asia, human security in Africa, military 
intervention, and smart sanctions. These articles appear to validate some of the 
major arguments and propositions made in this article. 
In his article on “Human Security, Peacebuilding, and the Responsibility to 
Protect in East Asia,” Brendan Howe uses country case studies to explain why the 
idea of protecting people has encountered difficult challenges. Driven by the need 
to defend state sovereignty and give priority to national security, states in East 
Asia continue to not embrace the norm of global intervention, especially when 
involving the use of military force within the context of R2P, but have instead 
placed emphasis on the need to prevent threats to human security through 
providing assistance for economic development. With that said, according to 
Howe, “East Asian actors and commentators have certainly become more engaged 
with the discourse, and this analysis of human security and the R2P in East Asia 
shows that the region is no longer the preserve of Westphalian statecentricity and 
sovereignty it has often been depicted.”
The extent to which the development-based approach officially or unofficially 
espoused by states, especially those in East Asia, can fully ensure the security of 
civilian populations is a subject of debate, but it is clear that too much emphasis 
on the need to ensure economic welfare also has its limitations. Economic growth 
alone has not been effectively translated into freedom from fear in East Asia, as 
threats to human rights continue and as prosperous states still spend more on 
national defense than on basic human needs. Only a handful of democratic states 
in East Asia have also been able to ensure freedom from fear. As further shown 
in the article entitled “Governance Perspectives of Human Security in Africa” 
by Kwesi Aning and Ernest Ansah Lartey the lack of democratic governance 
has been a major challenge to the idea of human security in the African region. 
According to the author, “in spite of all the plaudits about increasing economic 
growth in the region, poverty, hunger and diseases continue to expose weaknesses 
in the development paradigms and policies of most African countries.” Without 
a system of government that holds political leaders accountable for their policy 
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actions, it is unlikely that even the requirements of economic welfare can be 
effectively met and sustained. The security sector needs urgent and effective 
reform. 
While the system of democratic governance that is both accountable and 
transparent may be necessary for the promotion of freedom from fear (and 
freedom from want), it is far from clear how this objective can be achieved under 
certain dire circumstances. What if the environment for economic development 
is hindered by war and political violence? Would the use of force to end them be 
an effective tool? Would economic sanctions work better? Would the threat of 
judicial punishment help promote peace and democracy? 
The last two articles seek to answer these questions. Mats Berdal’s article 
“Revisiting the ‘Responsibility to Protect’” makes it clear that this type of military 
intervention continues to keep UN member states divided. Although the norm 
of R2P “has gradually come to command broad support from States,” it has 
made “scant difference” even when it matters most. Resistance to the norm 
continues. Berdal makes an argument in addition to one of the points advanced 
in this article namely that the use of military intervention in the form of R2P 
as evidenced by the NATO intervention in Libya exacerbated geopolitical 
competition among the great powers. In his words, “Rising geopolitical tensions, 
reflected in the breakdown of political relations among key members of the 
Security Council, have only added to a growing sense of pessimism among R2P 
advocates.” As noted earlier, the R2P type of intervention in the case of Libya 
also helped precipitate the resurgence of geopolitics to the detriment of human 
security by making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the international 
community to intervene militarily for human protection elsewhere.
A similar argument is made in the last article entitled “Why Smart Sanctions 
Still Cause Human Insecurity?” by Sorpong Peou. The author examines the 
optimistic proposition that multilateral and bilateral economic sanctions have 
been made smart in that this policy tool is capable of preventing collateral 
damage while getting target state leaders to change their policy behavior or 
actions such as human rights violations. Two case studies, the sanctions on North 
Korea and Myanmar, are adopted to test this proposition. Empirical evidence 
shows otherwise: economic sanctions have not become smart enough due to 
the fact that targeted state leaders are capable of outsmarting sanctions sending 
actors. In fact, this policy instrument has perpetuated human insecurity on 
different levels, including failure to undermine authoritarian regime leaders and 
to protect people from threats and freedom from fear. Instead of making policy 
changes in conformity to the terms of sanctions, the state leaders of these two 
authoritarian regimes have maintained high defense spending to justify the need 
for national defense while their primary concern has clearly been centered on 
regime security. In addition, they have developed closer relations with powerful 
authoritarian states like China and Russia. What available evidence shows is that 
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the target leaders of these two states are, first and foremost, either willing or able 
to protect their regime at any cost or at the cost of civilian populations despite the 
lack or decline of its political legitimacy.
In short, what this special issue clearly shows is that proponents of human 
security may need to acknowledge that their vision for a better world through 
securing humanity is far from realized and in many ways has seen a reversal in 
recent years. They also need to think harder about some of the policy measures 
and instruments adopted and implemented so far—and much harder still about 
the consequences of what we actually do and not simply what we ought to do.
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